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1. Measuring energy 
security: significance and policy 
implications  
 
1.1 Quantifying energy security 
Energy is a fundamental component of economic 
growth and development around the world, and 
despite the global financial crisis, in a global scale 
energy demand has continued growing in recent 
years. Energy security continues to be a major 
concern for most countries and/or economic blocks 
because key resources are limited and there is 
relatively little overlap between the leading energy 
producers and the major consumers. Therefore, 
most countries rely on international trade, which is 
vulnerable to economic disruptions, and political 
interventions. Markets for energy resource 
commodities have increasingly globalised, and 
events anywhere in the world can affect global 
supply and prices, even for self-sufficient 
economies. Energy security risks, therefore pose 
serious challenges on a global level. But each 
country and region faces and perceives energy 
security in a specific manner. Adequately tackling 
energy security is a challenge that relies upon 
precise understanding and quantifying the 
dimensions of energy security on national, 
regional, and international level. In the case of 
Bulgaria this requires  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MAIN POINTS  
 Energy security is of critical importance to Bulgaria. 
The biggest identified threat to Bulgarian national 
security is poverty, and in particular energy 
poverty. Bulgaria’s non-transparent energy sector 
seriously undermines the country’s economic 
development. Establishing regular sound 
monitoring mechanisms on energy security could 
be key for adequate policy-making in the area. 
 The Index of U.S. Energy Security Risk Indicator 
(IESRI), developed in 2012 by the Institute for 21st 
Century Energy at the American Chamber of 
Commerce shows that since 1980, Bulgaria has had 
one of the worst energy security risk index scores 
both nominally and compared to the OECD 
averages. Its scores over the period averaged 
about 158% higher than those for the OECD.  
 Bulgaria’s energy security risk index increased 
since 2010. This recent deterioration relative to 
OECD averages is based on the energy expenditure 
volatility of the Bulgarian economy that according 
to IESRI has increased more than 10 times in the 
last 3 years (since 2009), reaching in 2012 one of 
the highest levels since 1980). 
 Among the main risk factors to Bulgaria’s energy 
security is its high dependence on fossil fuels 
import, in particular in the gas sector. The very 
high concentration of the Bulgarian gas market 
(monopoly of supply and distribution) provides 
ample opportunities for rent-seeking. Bulgaria’s 
involvement in various national, smaller regional, 
and large international projects can reduce the 
risks to its energy security if it is based on clear-cut 
prioritization of preferred options following sound 
and transparent cost-benefit analysis. 
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understanding of national specificities, regional 
characteristics (South-East Europe and the Black 
Sea Region), and the European Union position. 
Delineating specific measurements for energy 
security is of immense importance to policy making 
in the area of energy policy, including treating the 
issues of energy affordability and energy poverty, 
on national and transnational level. For instance, 
European countries—many of which are resource 
poor cite climate change as a main driver of energy 
policy, while also voicing their concern over their 
dependence on Russian natural gas. Combining 
these two policy goals has narrowed the range of 
options European countries have available to them 
to address energy security risks, forcing them to 
often make subpar policy choices. In this sense, 
understanding the implications of energy security 
necessities is particularly important in order to 
shape adequate energy policies priorities on 
national and pan-European level. 
Quantifying energy security is not trivial and there 
is very little consensus on what metrics should be 
used1. One of the efforts, which have gained wide 
international recognition in quantifying energy 
security, is the Index of U.S. Energy Security Risk, 
developed in 2010 by the Institute for 21st Century 
Energy.2 The Index is an annual energy risk 
indicator, which uses quantifiable data, historical 
trend information, and government projections to 
identify the policies and other factors that 
                                                          
1 
There have been a number of efforts to carry out more 
detailed analysis with two useful developments being in 
portfolio optimization for the electricity sector and the 
development of aggregated energy security indicators. As per 
the paper from Bouzarovski – Buzar, Stefan, “Energy poverty in 
the EU: a review of the evidence”, in the case of the latter, 
these include indicators based on the Shannon index that 
captures diversity in suppliers in addition to fuel diversity, the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index that incorporates market 
concentration of suppliers, and the supply demand (S/D) index 
developed by ECN. 
2
 21
st
 Century Energy Institute – U.S. Chamber of Commerce 
(2012), International Index of Energy Security Risk: Assessing 
Risk in a Global Energy Market  
contribute positively or negatively to U.S. energy 
security. The Index provides a look at energy 
security retrospectively from 1970 to nowadays, 
and prospectively from nowadays to 30 years 
ahead. From this data, policymakers and energy 
professionals can use the Index to track shifts in 
U.S. energy security over time and assess potential 
impacts of new policies. In 2012, the Institute 
launched the International Index of Energy Security 
Risk, a new tool designed to facilitate a better 
understanding of global energy markets.  The 
International Index applies the same quantitative 
analysis used in the US Index to rank the top global 
energy users in 28 metrics. Unlike the US one, the 
international index does not provide a forecast but 
only a historical view. The index is based on a 
combination of global and national factors which 
affect energy security: global fuel reserves; fuel 
imports; national energy expenditure; price and 
market volatility; energy use intensity; reliability of 
electricity generation; efficiency of the transport 
sector and environmental policies. Bulgaria is 
included in the extended list as one of the world’s 
75 largest energy users. The purpose of the annual 
International Index is to help identifying significant 
transitions occurring in world energy markets while 
also monitoring the performance of major energy 
producers and consumers in coping with the energy 
security implications of these transitions.3 In this 
sense, the energy security index could fill in the 
niche of an international energy security 
scoreboard platform that could serve as the 
stepping-stone for successful and opportune 
energy policy making on national level. This is 
particularly true for smaller countries facing steep 
energy security challenges, as is the case of 
Bulgaria.  
 
                                                          
3
 21
st
 Century Energy Institute – U.S. Chamber of Commerce 
(2012), International Index of Energy Security Risk: Assessing 
Risk in a Global Energy Market, p. 5 
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1.2 The Case of Bulgaria: Energy Poverty as a 
Security Risk 
Monitoring the energy developments in Bulgaria 
and accordingly devising energy policy strategies 
that would adequately address the energy security 
risks the country is facing is of an immense 
importance to the economic, social, and political 
well-being of one of the newest EU member states. 
Bulgaria is in a unique energy security position in 
the EU. It is the poorest member-state, which 
constrains its policy options. It is a small and open 
economy, which lacks geopolitical weight or 
position, and is an energy policy taker of the EU as 
well as of its powerful neighbors Russia and Turkey. 
Its energy sector is mostly state-owned, badly 
managed, and heavily dependent on Russian 
resources and technology. Bulgaria’s first ever 
National Security Strategy adopted in 2011, states 
that the biggest threat to Bulgarian national 
security is poverty, and in particular energy 
poverty.4 Energy security and energy poverty are 
inter-related as low energy security usually 
translates into higher prices, or energy supply 
disruptions, and eventually into energy poverty and 
vice versa. And Bulgaria has been indicated in a 
number of studies as the most vulnerable to energy 
poverty country in the European Union (EU)5. 
Although affected to a lesser extent, the majority of 
the new EU member states from Southern and 
Central and Eastern Europe (EU -116), are also 
                                                          
4
 Bulgaria, Ministry of Economy and Energy, (2011), National 
Security Strategy of the Republic of Bulgaria. Accessed from: 
http://www.mi.government.bg/files/useruploads/files/national
_strategy1.pdf  
5
 Bouzarovski – Buzar, Stefan, “Energy poverty in the EU: a 
review of the evidence”, paper presented at Workshop and 
Conference on Energy Efficiency – EU Regional Policy, Brussels, 
Belgium, November 29 – 30, 2011. 
6
 EU-11 refers to the 11 former Soviet or Yugoslav block 
countries from Central and South-East Europe that have 
become the newest EU member states in the last three waves 
of EU enlargement – in 2004, 2007, and 2013. 
plagued by dangerously high levels of energy 
poverty.  
The residents of Bulgaria use disproportionately 
high amounts of coal and wood, as well as costly 
electricity to heat their homes, and pay substantial 
portion of their incomes for energy bills (Figure 1, 
Figure 2), while also not being able to keep their 
homes adequately warm. The limited reach of 
certain types of networked energy infrastructures 
(particularly gas) means that, in addition to 
affordability issues, energy deprivation is also 
predicated upon the spatial and technical 
limitations associated with switching towards more 
affordable fuel sources in the households. Some 
parts of the population have had no option other 
than using wood and coal for heating. In Bulgaria, 
switching towards this source of energy has clear 
positive income dimension. Subsidized household 
electricity prices, mostly through the de-
capitalization of the depreciating existing nuclear 
power plant in Kozloduy, and through the state 
guaranteed construction of the Maritsa East II coal-
fired power plant, as well as their state-owned 
parent company the National Electricity Company, 
has made Bulgarians overly reliant on electricity for 
heating. Hence, changes in electricity prices have 
had a disproportionately negative effect on energy 
poverty of households. This has made rising 
household electricity prices, the lowest in the EU, 
an issue of immense political danger.   
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Figure 1: Main heating sources by type of 
settlement in Bulgaria 
 Source: Bulgarian National Statistical Institute, 2013 
 
Figure 2: Average yearly income per household 
and percentage of expenditure on energy in 
Bulgaria 
Source: Eurostat, 2013 
The most popular heating fuels in Bulgaria are 
wood and electricity, used by 31.1% and 28.6% of 
households respectively. Only 0.7% of households 
use gas, which is a result mostly of the very high 
price of gas but also of the cross-subsidized 
electricity prices for households. The widespread 
utilization of wood and coal for heating is indicative 
of energy poverty among the population. According 
to EU statistics on income and living conditions, 
more than 30% of households in Bulgaria are 
unable to keep their homes adequately heated 
during the cold winter months. This is particularly 
worrying given that Bulgaria has one of the lowest 
energy consumption rates for space heating in 
Europe, with only 0.54 tonnes of oil equivalent per 
dwelling compared to the EU average of 0.94 
tonnes of oil equivalent per dwelling. Furthermore, 
the average Bulgarian household is spending an 
increasing proportion of its income on energy 
sources, including heating and electricity. This 
implies that despite using comparatively less 
energy to heat their homes, Bulgarians spend a 
higher proportion of their incomes on electricity 
than households in other EU member states. 
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2. Energy Security Risk Index 
for Bulgaria 
 
2.1 Overview 
Energy Security Risk Summary: Bulgaria 
Risk Scores:   
2012 Energy Security Risk Score                    1,846  
2012 Top 75 Energy User Group Rank                          73  
Score in Previous Year                    1,714  
Rank in Previous Year 70 
Score in 1980 3,524 
Average Score: 1980-2012 2,238 
Best Energy Security Risk Score 1,654 (2002) 
Worst Energy Security Risk Score 3,524 (1980) 
Risk Scores Relative to OECD Average:   
Average Annual Difference 1980-2012 158% 
Best Relative Score 75% (2009) 
Worst Relative Score 252% (1980) 
Source: Institute for 21st Century Energy 
The International Energy Security Risk Index (IESRI) 
of the Institute for 21st Century Energy opens the 
possibility to look inside Bulgaria’s energy security, 
adding a historical perspective on its development 
back to 1980.  IESRI results show that since then, 
the country has had one of the worst energy 
security risk index scores both nominally and 
compared to the OECD averages. Its scores over the 
period averaged about 158% higher than those for 
the OECD. However, unlike most of the other 
countries included in the index ranking, in absolute 
terms, Bulgaria’s overall risk has been trending 
downward throughout the period. 
 
Figure 3: Bulgaria vs. OECD: Risk Index Score 
Source: Institute for 21st Century Energy 
From its peak of 3,524—252% above the OECD 
average—in 1980, the country’s total risk score fell 
to 1,654 in 2002—still about 114% higher than the 
OECD average but a considerable improvement. 
Total risk spiked again in 2010, as a result of the 
economic crisis in the country, increasing energy 
poverty and social tensions (Figure 4 – Figure 5). 
Above all, the relative deterioration of Bulgarian 
scores are based on worrying results in terms of 
energy expenditures volatility, which according to 
IESRI have increased more than 10 times in the 
years since 2009, reaching in 2012 one of its highest 
levels since 1980.  
Like many other European countries, Bulgaria has 
no indigenous production of energy resources 
other than coal. Its import risks for everything 
except coal have been exponentially higher than 
the OECD average for most of the period since 
1992. As a result, the country’s expenditures on 
fossil fuels imports as a share of GDP, although 
improving, have over the years remained much 
higher than the OECD average.  
On the positive side, Bulgaria’s power sector is 
quite diverse. It is one of the few countries with 
capacity diversity scores (though only marginally) 
better than the OECD average. Typical of an 
economy in transition, its energy use and emissions 
per capita measures are better than the OECD 
ones, and these appear to be improving at about 
the same rate as the OECD’s.  
Figure 4: Bulgaria: Risk Variance from OECD 
Source: Institute for 21st Century Energy 
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2.2 Positive Developments vs. Main 
Challenges for Bulgarian Energy Security 
according to the most recent index results 
 Positive results/developments:  
Bulgaria demonstrates lower energy security risks 
than the OECD average on a number of indicators. 
However, from a developmental point of view only 
two of these comparative advantages look 
sustainable. These are the coal import exposure 
and the electricity capacity diversity. In coal 
Bulgaria has the only indigenous energy resource, 
although it produces only low-grade lignite coal. In 
electricity generation Bulgaria has developed all 
options but gas. A key challenge in this respect is 
keeping up with investment requirements for 
replacing existing generation capacity, e.g. in 
nuclear as well as better embedding the respective 
production in the local industrial and technological 
environment.  
Figure 5: Index components in which Bulgaria 
performed better than the OECD average (lower 
energy security risk levels) 
Source: Institute for 21st Century Energy 
The other demonstrated lower security risk level 
indicators are typical for less developed countries. 
CO2 emissions trend and CO2 per capita have been 
at lower levels because of the steep 
deindustrialization process of Bulgaria since the 
collapse of its centrally planned industrial 
complexes in the 1990-ies. Transport energy per 
capita and energy consumption per capita have 
shown better scores as Bulgarians have been forced 
by lower incomes to use less energy for transport 
and consumption. The electricity retail prices have 
been lower because of continuing regulation of the 
household market. But their rise in 2012, have 
caused widespread social discontent with 
substantial negative consequences for the country’s 
security. This discussion comes to show that no 
single measurement of energy security risk should 
be regarded in isolation and without clear policy 
perspective. What is low risk now can turn into a 
high risk potential in the future due to changing 
circumstances, social and economic conditions, 
technological breakthroughs, etc.   
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 Main challenges for Bulgarian energy 
security: 
Similarly higher than the OECD energy security risk 
indicators also need careful consideration. Due to 
its very low GDP and the high levels of hidden 
economy combined with the country’s aging energy 
infrastructure and deep-seated patterns of 
inefficient energy consumption (both industrial and 
residential energy use), Bulgaria faces abnormally 
higher energy security risks on all energy intensity 
dimensions. These risks however are mostly related 
to internal inefficiencies and costs and have been 
generally edging lower with the penetration of 
market economy rules in the country, yet still at 
quite unsatisfactory levels. The highest 
demonstrated risk to Bulgaria’s energy security is 
its high energy expenditures levels and their 
volatility. Energy expenditures metrics show the 
magnitude of energy costs to produce a unit of 
national income and the exposure of consumers to 
price shocks.  
Figure 6: Index components in which Bulgaria 
performed worse than the OECD average (higher 
energy security risk levels). 
Source: Institute for 21st Century Energy 
This is reminiscent of the country’s high relative 
energy poverty and the low levels of its GDP. It also 
reveals the relation between the high exposure to 
fossil fuel import shocks, the low income levels, and 
the limited competitiveness of the Bulgarian 
economy (Figure 9). While gas import exposure 
energy security risk does not appear that much 
higher than in the OECD countries, this is mainly 
due to the disproportionately low level of 
household gas consumption in the country, which 
relates to the overreliance of households on 
electricity for heating. The 2009 gas crisis in Europe 
has shown that while Bulgaria’s economy can 
handle gas supply disruptions, its effects on 
households’ and industries’ trust in government 
institutions is quite negative. In effect, Bulgaria was 
among the top three worse affected countries by 
the gas supply disruption in Europe then. That is 
why, given the high and rising prices of electricity in 
Europe, and the country’s energy poverty, 
developing alternative gas supplies and tapping into 
lower gas prices to help develop household gas and 
central heating consumption is a viable option for 
lowering the energy security risks for Bulgaria in the 
future.  
34 50 
71 92 
165 
255 
353 
663 
15 11 20 
51 43 53 37 
20 
Gas import
exposure
CO2 GDP
intensity
Petroleum
intensity
Transport
energy
intensity
Energy
intensity
Fossil fuel
import
expenditure
per GDP
Energy
expenditure
intensity
Energy
expenditure
volatility
Bulgaria OECD
 
BULGARIA’S ENERGY SECURITY RISK INDEX 
 
  This publication is supported in part by a  
  grant from the Open Society Foundations 
 
8 
Figure 7: Nominal Fossil Fuel Import as a % of 
Nominal GDP (1998-2012) 
 
Source: BNB/NSI 
 
Figure 8: Growth of Nominal Fossil Fuel Import vs. 
Nominal GDP Growth (1998-2012) 
Source: BNB/NSI 
 
3. Energy Security and  Gas 
Supply in Bulgaria7 
 
3.1 Overview and Gas Transit Arrangements 
Bulgaria has only limited capabilities of natural gas 
production, which has recently been expanded by 
the discovery of gas in its Black Sea shelf, with more 
shelf discoveries potentially pending. Bulgaria 
meets almost its entire gas demand through 
imports from Russia through a single pipeline. The 
import and transit pipeline systems are physically 
separated. The transit system has been effectively 
reserved for Gazprom’s use only by contract until 
2030, and is not connected to the national gas 
transmission pipelines. Under existing contracts, 
Bulgaria receives payment from Gazprom for the 
transit of up to 17 billion cubic meters (bcm) 
annually for Turkey, Greece, and Macedonia. This 
was more than six times the entire internal demand 
for 2010.8 These current arrangements between 
Bulgaria and Russia for gas supply and transition 
are limiting from security of supply standpoint 
while also in clear confrontation of EU’s market 
liberalization guidelines in regards to open access 
to pipelines and “take or pay” clauses, utilized by 
Gazprom. The “take or pay” issue is related to 
payment of volumes of gas that have not been 
effectively consumed by Bulgarian side and there 
has already been a legal precedent against 
                                                          
7
 Information and opinions expressed in this section are 
predominantly based on the Center for the Study of Democracy 
(CSD), “Security of Gas Supply: SEE Perspectives and 
Challenges”, presented at the “Trans-Anatolian gas pipeline: 
Challenges and Prospects for the Black Sea countries and the 
Balkans” conference, Istanbul, Turkey, September 28-29, 2012, 
http://www.csd.bg/artShow.php?id=16199  
8
 “Gazprom Export – Bulgaria”, accessed July 30, 2013, 
Accessed from: 
http://www.gazpromexport.ru/en/partners/bulgaria/  
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Gazprom in that regard in the RWE Transgaz vs. 
Gazprom case9. 
 
3.2 Involvement in International Pipeline Projects 
and Regional Interconnectors 
Bulgaria is at the crossing point of two major 
competing international pipeline projects for new 
gas supply to Europe and plans the development of 
as much as four inter-connectors to all of its 
neighbouring countries with the exception of the 
FYR of Macedonia. However, the country has so far 
not provided detailed public cost-benefit analyses10 
for the different options and there is no clear cut 
prioritization or preferred options, which leads to 
lack of transparency and frequent (perceived) 
inconsistencies in the Bulgarian position regarding 
major energy projects. This also creates higher 
energy security risks and uncertainty about the 
effects of these projects for Bulgaria’s economy.  
Nabucco and Southern Corridor pipelines 
Bulgaria has voiced repeatedly its preference 
towards the development of the EU's Southern 
Corridor pipelines, and in particular the Nabucco 
project as part of its EU integration project. 
Through the Bulgarian Energy Holding (BEH)’s 
16.67% stake in Nabucco's consortium, Bulgaria is a 
founding partner in the project to bring to Europe 
as much as 30 bcm of gas annually. The fact that 
commercial funding was unlikely to be secured until 
capacity was booked and future transit fees 
                                                          
9
 Capital daily, “Газпром" изгуби дело по важно условие от 
договорите си в Европа”, 25 October 2012, Accessed from: 
http://www.capital.bg/politika_i_ikonomika/sviat/2012/10/25/
1933012_gazprom_izgubi_delo_po_vajno_uslovie_ot_dogovori
te_si/  
10
 Over the last decade, the Center for the Study of Democracy 
(CSD) has championed the introduction and widespread 
utilization of internationally recognized energy project 
management principles and cost-benefit analysis tools such as 
EITI and COST in Bulgaria.  
(for more information on EITI initiative in Bulgaria, visit 
http://www.csd.bg/artShow.php?id=15111) 
budgeted for led to the creation of smaller 
Nabucco-West project. However, it became 
obvious that a phased development would be 
necessary with different pipelines delivering the gas 
to the Turkish-Bulgarian border and another one 
transferring it across the region. In that context, an 
intra -‘Southern Corridor’ competition was created 
between other planned Southern Corridor 
pipelines such as TAP and SEEP plus eventual 
connection to the ITGI interconnector system. As 
the TAP project does not cross Bulgarian territory, it 
was obvious that if affordable, a connection 
between Trans-Anatolian gas pipeline (TANAP) and 
Nabucco-West would be the ultimate Southern 
Corridor solution for Bulgaria. The project may have 
also aided the development of a competitive 
national energy market, through adding 
competitors to the current sole supplier - Gazprom, 
and permitting half of capacity to be available for 
third party access.  
On 28th of June 2013, the Shah Deniz Consortium 
(SDC) declared to choose the TAP pipeline for gas 
transportation after TANAP in Turkey, dealing a 
heavy blow to the Nabucco idea, and effectively 
halting the project. This choice is expected to have 
far reaching implications not only for Bulgaria but 
also for Central and Eastern Europe and the 
Southern energy corridor – a cornerstone of energy 
security for the European Union, Central Asian and 
Caspian countries in the short to medium term 
perspective. Although the quantities of potential 
gas deliveries from Shah Deniz are too small to 
directly challenge Russian gas dominance, they 
could tilt critical gas market balances in the SEE 
with a multiplier effect across Central and Eastern 
Europe.  
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South Stream  
Bulgaria has also subscribed to the South Stream 
gas pipeline from its very beginning although it has 
so far demonstrated much less willingness to 
proceed with the project, primarily due to its high 
and rising costs. There has not been a publicly 
available cost-benefit analysis of the project, both 
overall and for its Bulgarian part. The latter is to be 
constructed by a company equally owned by Russia 
and Bulgaria, through Gazprom and BEH, which was 
set up in November 2011, following a 2009 
Agreement of Cooperation between the two 
parties. Negotiations on the project have been 
opaque, with Russia applying considerable 
pressure on the Bulgarian government for firm 
commitment to starting construction, while 
Bulgaria has been dragging its feet in the hope that 
the “game” is resolved at a higher EU - Russia 
level11. In November 2012, a memorandum of 
understanding was signed that further clarified an 
investment structure with some very sensitive 
aspects. The spike in the price of the project since 
its inception has led many observers to believe that 
the project can turn into considerable strain on 
Bulgaria’s state finances, further exacerbating the 
country’s energy security risks12 The project also 
holds little promise to improving the affordability 
aspect of energy security in the country in the 
future without continuing subsidies from transit 
towards consumption, as it only provides a new 
route but the supplier is the same.  
 
                                                          
11
 Stefanov, Ruslan and Tsanov, Martin  “Bulgarian Energy 
Policy”, Aspen Review, (2012), Accessed from: 
http://www.aspeninstitute.cz/images_upload/files/Aspen%20R
eview/Bulgarian_Energy_Policy.pdf    
12
 Dnevnik. Bg, „Цената за „Южен поток поставя съмнения за 
източване“, 11 July 2013, Accessed from: 
http://www.dnes.bg/politika/2013/07/11/cenata-za-iujen-
potok-postavia-symneniia-za-iztochvane.193358  
Regional interconnectors and reverse flow 
connections with neighbouring countries  
As Bulgarian influence over major upstream 
projects remains limited, Sofia, backed by Brussels, 
has also been increasingly turning its attention to 
more regional approaches concerning supply, 
notably interconnectors with Turkey, Romania, 
Greece and Serbia. Bulgarian diplomacy and 
companies can have much more influence on such 
smaller projects, making them an immediate 
priority in the agenda for achieving higher security 
of natural gas supply in Bulgaria, and potentially 
lower prices in the future. In addition EU has 
provided 1/4 of the funds for all interconnectors 
to neighbouring countries, which makes the 
projects particularly cost effective for the country 
though the question of ensuring gas supplies over 
the planned pipelines remains. As of September 
2013, a sub-contractor has been selected for the 
construction of the reverse flow connection with 
Romania.13 The Bulgarian part of the connection is 
constructed (up to Rousse) and is undergoing test 
stage. However, for the under-river part, 
connecting Bulgarian and Romani, only a contract 
has been signed between Bulgartransgaz EAD 
(Bulgaria) and Transgaz S.A. (Romania) for project 
drafting and construction. The project is running 
behind schedule as it was envisaged the connection 
to be operational by first quarter of 201314. Reverse 
flow connection with Greece is in roadmap 
consulting stage and impact assessment and 
market interest analysis procedures are taking 
place in Bulgaria and Greece15. As a whole, the 
construction of the reverse flow gas connection is 
                                                          
13
 Ministry of Energy and Economy, „Доклад за състоянието 
на енергетиката в република България“, July 2013 
14
 Mediapool.bg, “Газовата връзка с Румъния отложена за 
догодина”, 31 July 2013, Accessed from: 
 http://www.mediapool.bg/gazovata-vrazka-s-rumaniya-
otlozhena-za-dogodina-news209594.html  
15
 Ministry of Energy and Economy, „Доклад за състоянието 
на енергетиката в република България“, July 2013 
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11 
going to plan and should be operational by January 
201516.  
As a whole, interconnections and reverse flow 
connections are seen as an essential part of the 
Bulgarian energy strategy for lowering energy 
security risks for the country, for the region, and for 
the EU. The interconnectors' contribution to 
Bulgarian security of supply is two-fold: a) allowing 
for reverse flow emergency supplies in the case of a 
supply disruption from other sources, and b) 
enabling the diversification of import in both transit 
route and supply source. However, the share of 
pipeline capacity allocation between the countries 
sharing the interconnectors has not been decided 
yet, which together with ensuring contracts for the 
supply of gas have turned into a sticky point in 
negotiations. The fact that despite EU funding 
support, it took Bulgaria more than three years 
after the January 2009 crisis to officially launch the 
construction of the first of these interconnectors 
(Bulgaria-Romania) shows that successful 
implementation of energy policies in the region 
face various political challenges, over and above 
financial and economic concerns. It is due to this 
reason that Bulgaria is facing legal action from the 
European Commission in regards to its failure to 
make sustainable process in the area of reverse 
flow connections with neighbouring countries, 
Romania in particular.   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
16
 Mediapool.bg, “Газовата връзка с Румъния отложена за 
догодина”, 31 July 2013, Accessed from:  
http://www.mediapool.bg/gazovata-vrazka-s-rumaniya-
otlozhena-za-dogodina-news209594.html  
4. Bulgaria’s Perspectives 
from an Energy Security 
Standpoint 
 
The Energy Security Risk Index suggests that 
Bulgaria is currently exposed to two major 
interrelated energy security risks: 
 
 Energy poverty comes as the most serious energy 
security risk for the country with pervasive 
political and economic implications. Rising 
electricity prices, coupled with the loss of 
purchasing power during the continuing 
economic crisis, have led to widespread social 
discontent in 2012 – 2013, which has ultimately 
toppled the Bulgarian government in February 
2013. This has also resulted in the reversal of 
EU inspired electricity market reforms for more 
transparency for final users and more 
independence for the energy regulator, as 
politicians have stepped in to guarantee the 
freezing and even the cutting of electricity 
prices and the bashing of the regulator. The 
negative effects form such market defying 
actions are likely to be far reaching and will 
increase Bulgarian energy security risks in the 
long term, trumping short term gains in energy 
security from lower energy poverty risks. The 
depression of electricity prices will have one or 
more negative effects on the sector. It will lead 
to de-capitalization of enterprises along the 
value chain, with state-owned enterprises 
being the most likely ultimate victims, should 
the government not find an agreeable way to 
re-negotiate green energy prices and long-term 
generation contracts. Investors are likely to 
hold off any on-going or new projects, with the 
state left as the single decision-maker and 
sponsor of new generation capacity. Price 
distortions will keep households hostage to 
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electricity consumption, cannibalizing further 
on gas consumption and central heating. The 
energy intensity of the economy will remain a 
high risk for the energy security of the country. 
Last but not least, Bulgaria is likely to get into 
trouble with the European Commission on the 
implementation of its market liberalization 
obligations.  
 Gas supply diversification and disruption risks 
are closely related to energy poverty and 
electricity prices, as this is the most viable 
options for the Bulgarian economy to receive 
lower energy alternatives after coal and wood, 
which are very harmful to the environment and 
the living environment in settlements.  
 
Although gas supply and diversification risks stand 
as one of the most pressing challenges to the 
country’s energy security in the next decade it 
could be expected that relevant mitigation of these 
circumstances will start in the next 5 years. Bulgaria 
is involved in various national, smaller regional, and 
large international projects, which will contribute to 
higher energy security. But it cannot be realistically 
expected that the country can realize all of its gas 
projects in the next decade due to challenging 
economics. That is why prioritization of projects is 
very important. In this respect the construction of 
the interconnectors between Bulgaria and Greece, 
Turkey, and Romania is of the most immediate 
significance for the country’s gas supply security.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For Bulgaria to strengthen its overall energy 
security it can follow some proven steps: 
 
 Prioritization of regional integration 
through construction of interconnectors 
and/or reverse flow extensions of existing 
pipelines in the region 
 Improving “switchability” by introduction 
of interruptible contracts to be made and 
equipping industry and thermal stations 
with effective dual-fuel capability 
 At least minority stake privatization of 
large state-owned energy holdings might 
prove viable for bringing in private 
investors and spurring dynamics in the 
industry 
 Implementation of internationally 
recognized rules and guidelines on 
transparency of energy project 
management and energy resources’ supply 
governance, such as the Extractive 
Industries Transparency Initiative and/or 
COST principles, as part of the obligatory 
accounting principles on national level. 
 
